Email attachments are a growing delivery vector for malware. While machine learning (ML) has been successfully applied to portable executable (PE) malware detection, we ask, can we extend static ML approaches to detect malware across common email attachment file types, e.g., office documents and Zip archives? To this end, we collected a dataset of over 5 million malicious/benign Microsoft Office documents along with a smaller data set, which we use to provide more realistic estimates of thresholds for false positive rates on in-the-wild data. We also collected a dataset of approximately 500k malicious/benign Zip archives on which we performed a separate evaluation. We analyzed predictive performance using 70/30 train/test time splits, evaluating feature and classifier types that have been applied successfully in commercial PE antimalware products and R&D contexts. Using deep neural networks and gradient boosted decision trees, we are able to obtain ROC curves with > 0.99 AUC on both office document and Zip archive datasets. Discussion of deployment viability in various antimalware contexts is provided.
I. INTRODUCTION
Email attachment attacks generally rely on tricking users into downloading and opening malicious attached files. From an attacker's perspective, it is thus desirable to craft attachments that appear legitimate yet have sufficient flexibility to embed malicious content. Unfortunately, many common file types exchanged in corporate environments make this easy, and in a large organization, where message contents are impersonal and files are exchanged on a routine basis, a sufficiently complacent user is bound to arise [1] -all it takes is one.
In this paper, we examine two such attachment formats: Office documents and Zip archives. Malicious office documents can be difficult to detect because they leverage ubiquitous multi-purpose functionality, e.g., Microsoft Office documents allow embedding of multimedia, Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros, JavaScript, and even executable binaries. These capabilities have led to usable aesthetically pleasing office software, but they can also be used as to embed malicious code. Since consumers demand the ability to embed content, however, locking down such functionality is not feasible. Archives (e.g., Zip, RAR) are even less constrained in their internal contents than than office documents, and can easily be packed with any file type. In both malicious and benign settings, archives have been used to store code fragments that are later executed by software external to the archive, or conversely, archives have been embedded into other programs to form selfextracting archives [2] . In a canonical malicious usecase, archives are distributed via phishing techniques [3] such as impersonating an important contact, perhaps via spoofed email header, with the hope that the victim will unpack and run the archive's contents, e.g., a malicious JavaScript file executed outside of a browser sandbox.
Machine learning (ML) seems like a natural approach to detect malware across such unconstrained file types. Unlike signature-only engines, ML offers the advantage that it can learn to generalize malicious behavior, and potentially detect novel malware types. In this paper, we assess the viability of developing a static ML email attachment scanner for office documents and zip archives, leveraging techniques that have worked well for other file formats (e.g., PE). Our work makes the following contributions:
• We present evidence to support the viability of an ML-based malicious email attachment detection engine using millions of collected malicious/benign samples. • We present evaluations on novel real-world attacks using Microsoft Office Documents infected with Petya, suggesting that ML methods may work when signature methods fail. • We present a more realistic evaluation method for conducting evaluations with noisy test data. • We present an evaluation of classifiers and feature types for office document and archive malware.
II. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS AND RELATED WORK
Literature is sparse on malicious office document detection: Nissim et al. [4] employ an approach which uses zip file paths across a small dataset of docx files, but their approach is Open-XML specific and their data set is too small to conclude how their approach might perform at realistic deployment scale. Lagadec enumerates security issues with office document formats and how to manually detect them [5] without ML. While Lagadec [5] briefly discusses zip malware, we were only able to find peripheral discussions of archive malware. Malicious PDF detection [6] , [7] is a similar vein of research, but existing approaches focus on parsing the PDF format which is fragile and does not generalize well to other formats, and those that rely on dynamic analysis are expensive and do not scale nicely. We seek a generic approach that scales well.
Many academic papers discuss ML antimalware approaches in theory, but most use outdated and unrealistic datasets [8] . Our classifiers and feature types, by contrast, have worked well for real-world antimalware problems involving detection of malicious PE files at commercial scale. Saxe and Berlin employ a deep neural network similar to ours [9] , while Anderson and Roth employ gradient boosted decision trees [10] . However, document and archive file formats have their own unique challenges: they expected to store user provided content which may or may not be executed, while PE files contain more-specified streams of execution.
As classifiers, we use feed-forward deep neural networks and gradient boosted decision tree ensembles. While one could try other types of neural networks -e.g., convolutional and recurrent, these are difficult to implement in practice due to large file sizes, computational overhead, and difficulty to characterize generic bytelevel embeddings (this is in contrast to character-level embeddings which work well for certain antimalware problems, e.g., [11] ). Thus, we instead transform each document/archive to a fixed-length feature vector before using it to train a classifier.
Note that our focus in this paper is on on static detection. Dynamic detection, is a complementary research area, and is often employed to post-process static detections, but dynamic detection data is difficult to obtain at scale.
III. FILE STRUCTURES
Modern office documents generally fall into one of two types: OLE2 (.doc, .xls, and .ppt extensions) [12] and the newer XML standard [13] (.docx, .xlsx, and .pptx extensions). The OLE2 standard was set forth by Microsoft and is also known as the Compound File Binary Format or Common Document File Format. OLE2 documents can be viewed as their own file-systems, analogous to FAT, wherein embedded streams are accessed via an index table. These streams can be viewed as sub-files and contain text, VBA macros, JavaScript, formatting objects, images, and even executable binary code.
Open XML formatted office documents contain similar objects, but are compressed as archives via Zip standard compression. Within each archive, the path to the embedded content is specified via XML. The user interface unpacks and renders relevant content within the Zip archive. Although the file format is different from OLE2, the types of embedded content contained are similar between the two formats.
Many file types including XML office documents, JARs, APKs, and some browser extensions are specific cases of the more general Zip archive format. The Zip archive structure is shown in Fig. 1 . The central directory structure, located near the end of the file contains names, references, and metadata about relevant files residing in the archive. The references in the central directory structure point to file headers, which contain additional metadata, followed by compressed versions of the files. An entropy heat map of a zip archive plotted over a Hilbert Curve, generated using the BinVis http://binvis.io/#/ tool. The high-entropy regions (magenta) correspond to file contents, while the lower-entropy regions (blue/black) correspond to metadata. One can see that this archive contains three files, and one can easily discern the central directory structure at the end. Best viewed in color.
IV. FEATURE TYPES
In order to train ML classifiers, files must first be transformed into floating point feature vector representations. From a practical perspective, these feature vectors must be reliable and efficient to extract, particularly for archives, which can be hundreds of gigabytes in length. In this section, we describe methods that extract feature vectors from an arbitrary sequence of bytes. Several are adapted from [9] , but we are the first to explore the utility of these representations for common email attachment formats.
N -gram Histograms are derived from taking N -gram frequencies [14] over raw bytes. In practice, we use 3,4,5, and 6-grams, and apply the hashing trick [15] to fix the dimensionality of the input feature space.
String Length-Hash Features are obtained by applying delimiters to a sequence of bytes and taking frequency histograms of strings. Along a similar vein to Saxe and Berlin [9] , [11] , we apply the hashing trick over multiple logarithmic scales on string length and concatenate the resultant histograms into a fixed-size vector.
Byte Entropy Features are obtained by taking a fixed-size sliding window, with a given stride, over a sequence of bytes and computing the entropy of each window. For each byte value, for a given window, the byte entropy calculation in that window (or zero) is stored, and a 2D histogram is taken over (byte value, entropy) pairs. The rasterized histogram becomes the fixed-size feature vector. In this paper, we employ a window size of 1024 with a stride of 256.
Byte Mean-Standard Deviation Features are obtained using a similar fixed-size sliding window of given stride, but this time, the 2D histogram is taken over pairs of (byte mean, byte standard deviation) within each window. The rasterized histogram becomes the fixed-size feature vector. Similar to byte entropy features, we we employ a window size of 1024 with a stride of 256.
V. CLASSIFIER TYPES
We conducted our evaluations using two classifier types: deep neural networks (DNNs) and gradient boosted decision tree ensembles.
Neural networks consist of compositions of parametric layers, which map input vectors to output labels. Additional layers (depth) yield a more expressive model but also more opportunity for over-fitting. Neural networks with more than one hidden (non input or output) layer are said to be "deep neural networks". In our case, the input is a feature vector from a file, and the output is a scalar malicious or benign label. Parameters are tuned during training to accurately classify the training set. The effectiveness of the network is then evaluated using a separate data set. We implemented our DNN in Keras [16] , employing a similar topology that that of Berlin [9] , using 4 hidden layers of size 1024 each with rectified linear unit (ReLU) activations. At each layer we employ dropout and and batch normalization regularization methods, with a dropout ratio of 0.2. At the final output we use a sigmoid cross-entropy loss function: (1) where θ correspond to all parameters over the network, x i corresponds to the ith training example, y i corresponds to the label for that example, f (x i ) corresponds to the pre-activation output of the final layer, and σ(·) is the logistic sigmoid function. We optimized θ using the Keras framework's default ADAM [17] solver, with minibatch size of 10k, and performed early stopping when loss over a validation set failed to decrease for 10 consecutive epochs.
Decision trees, by contrast, partition the input feature space directly in a piecewise-linear manner, but their classificatoins tend to exhibit extremely high variance.
By aggregating an ensemble of trees, this variance can be decreased. Gradient boosting [18] iteratively adds trees to the ensemble; given loss function J(F (x; θ), y), and classification function F (x; θ) for the ensemble, a subsequent tree is added to the ensemble at each iteration to fit pseudo-residuals of the training set, − ∂J(F (xi;θ),yi)
∂F (xi;θ)
. The subsequent tree's decisions are then weighted so as to minimize the loss of the overall ensemble. For our gradient boosted ensembles, we used a regularized logistic sigmoid cross-entropy loss function, similar to that of our neural network (cf. Eq. 1). Our implementation uses the eXtreme Gradient Boosting (XGBoost) library of Chen et al. [19] . For hyperparameters, we employed a maximum depth per tree of 6, a subsample ratio of 0.5 (on training data; not columns), and hyperparameter η of 0.1. We used ten rounds without improvement in classification accuracy over a validation set as a stopping criterion for growing the ensemble.
VI. OFFICE DOCUMENTS: EXPERIMENTS AND DISCUSSION
We collected an initial dataset of 5,023,243 malicious and benign office documents by scraping files and reports from an online aggregation service which submits files to a variety of antimalware products and returns vendor responses. We assign malicious/benign labels on a 5+/1basis, i.e., documents which one or fewer vendors labeled malicious, we ascribe the aggregate label benign, while documents which 5 or more vendors labeled malicious, we ascribe the aggregate label malicious. We omit documents between 2 and 4 (inclusive) vendor responses from our dataset. We use this 5+/1-criterion because we want our classifier to be able to make a good prediction that is somewhat unaffected by biases within the vendor community and because empirical analysis internal to Sophos suggests that this labeling scheme works reasonably well for assigning aggregate malicious/benign scores. the goal here is not merely to emulate vendor aggregation but to learn predictive latent patterns that correctly make future predictions of malicious/benign when other vendors' signature-based methods fail. The breakdown of our aggregator-derived document dataset by format type is shown in Fig. 2 .
Since our objective is to obtain an estimate of predictive deployment performance of a given classifier, we performed a 70/30 quantile split on the first seen timestamp, allocating the first 70th percentile as a training set and the last 30th percentile as our test set. Note that for realistic evaluation, all training samples must come temporally before all test samples, precluding kfold cross validation across all data.
We conducted a multitude of experiments using both DNN and XGBoost classifiers with byte entropy histograms, string length-hash histograms, and byte meanstandard deviation histograms as features. We extracted features across whole documents, and found that lengthhash features disproportionately performed the best of any one feature type when delimiting by non-printable characters as well as "<", ">", "/", "\", and " ". Byte and Common Crawl dataset (CC). We believe that the VT dataset is rife with false positives that all vendors miss, and that obtaining TPRs on the VT dataset at FPRs/thresholds derived from the CC dataset yields a more realistic evaluation. entropy and mean-standard deviation histograms were uniformly spaced along each axis, initially to have a total of 1024 bins, then later downsized to 256 bins each after experiments indicated negligible gain from added feature dimension. String length-hash features were configured to have a total of 1024 dimensions; 64 per logarithmic scale of string length. Only strings between 5 and 128 characters were considered. We also logarithmically scaled the bins as we found that this resulted in a slight performance increase. We also tried unpacking and concatenating the contents of compressed Open XML format documents prior to extracting features. Surprisingly, this resulted in a performance decrease, which suggests that our classifiers predominantly learn from file metadata.
Using concatenations of all feature vectors for both DNN and XGBoost classifiers, we were able to obtain an area under a receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curve of greater than 0.99, with the DNN slightly outperforming XGBoost (cf. red lines in Fig. 3 ). Using the same features to train a linear support vector machine under a tuned C value yielded less than 0.90 AUC, suggesting that nonlinear concepts can indeed be derived from our input feature space representations, pointing to the utility of more expressive nonlinear classifiers.
Interestingly, we found that the DNN's performance did not noticeably improve when concatenating all features, as opposed to just string length-hash features, but XGBoost's performance improved substantially. This suggests that our DNN architecture is favorable, from 978-1-5386-3443-1/18/$31.00 ©2018 IEEE Fig. 4 . Numeric breakdown of Common Crawl dataset documents by file type. As with our main datset, the majority of available data consists of legacy (.doc) and new (.docx) word processing formats, suggesting coarse alignment in terms of dataset balance/bias. This is an important consideration when using the dataset to assess realistic thresholds for false positive rate. Best viewed in color. a deployment perspective, since feature extraction accounts for the majority of processing time at inference -especially for large documents.
As an exploratory analysis, we also tried using the outputs from intermediate layers of the trained network on our train and test sets as feature vectors for XGBoost, since the learning processes of the two classifiers are fundamentally different, but this resulted in a performance degradation. We also tried training models with additional hidden layers, which yielded slightly decreased performance, as well as separate malicious/benign outputs -one per file-type -along with a global malicious/benign score under a MOON-like topology [20] . While the MOON-like network yielded slightly better performance in low FPR regions of the ROC, performance deteriorated in higher FPR regions, yielding no net gains for the added complexity.
During our evaluation, we conducted our own forensic investigation of the dataset, dumping VBA macros for 100 "benign" files from our data that our DNN labeled malicious with high confidence. In the majority of cases, we found signs of malicious payloads and code obfuscation, suggesting that a good number of "false positives" from our dataset might actually be novel attacks that all vendors missed, and are thus false negatives in our "ground truth" labels.
This finding from our forensic analysis leads us to surmise that using vendor labels from online aggregators as a test criterion may be unfairly penalizing solutions capable of generalizing to novel attacks, and that using these labels gives us an unfairly pessimistic estimate of false positive rate (FPR) since files submitted to such online services are far more likely to be malicious (or at least suspicious) than most files in the wild. We therefore collected an additional data set of approximately 1 million likely benign documents scraped from known benign URLs from Common Crawl [21] -a web archiving service -and submitted these to an online service for labeling. We discarded the 15 of these documents that were labeled as malicious, taking the rest as benign. We then used this Common Crawl-derived dataset to re-evaluate FPR, and with the corresponding thresholds, estimated the true positive rate (TPR) on our main dataset. Via this procedure, we were able to achieve noticeable gains (cf. the blue lines in Fig.3 ). Note that this may even be an under-estimate of true performance because gains in the network from detecting mislabeled false negatives in our main dataset are not recognized (but at least now they are not penalized).
As an additional qualitative analysis of our network's generalization capability, we analyzed office documents infected by the recent Petya ransomware, a malware notorious for employing novel exploits [22] . Petya was able to propagate undetected and cause a global cyber security crisis despite the presence of numerous antimalware engines. At a threshold yielding an FPR of 1e-3 assessed on our Common Crawl dataset, we were able to detect 5 out of 9 malicious Petya samples, which provides further (albeit anecdotal) evidence that our DNN may have learned to generalize beyond the capacity of signaturedriven systems. Note that the network was trained only on data collected prior to the Petya outbreak.
VII. ZIP ARCHIVES: EXPERIMENTS AND DISCUSSION
Along a similar vein to our office document dataset, we collected approximately 500k Zip archives by scraping the same online aggregation services. We found that Zip archives exhibited much larger variation in size than office documents. We performed a similar 70/30 train/test split on timestamps as we did for office documents, grouping samples with first seen timestamps in the first 70th percentile into our training set and samples with first seen timestamps in the last 30th percentile into our test set.
While we could simply extract and concatenate content and metadata, from a practical perspective, this becomes problematic when dealing with large, potentially nested zip archives. Moreover, findings from Sec. VI suggest that useful features for classification are typically contained within metadata for a very structured subset of Zip archives (Open XML format office documents). As an initial measure, we extracted string length-hash features over entire archives and fit a DNN. This yielded an ROC with an AUC of less than 0.9, which is not useful for commercial antimalware applications.
We hypothesized that this poor performance was due to a low signal-to-noise ratio in the feature space, and thus chose to extract a set of features over more relevant sections of Zip archives: First, by matching appropriate magic numbers, we dumped raw bytes from each archive's central directory structure. We then dumped the last 1 MB of the archive's raw bytes, or the entire archive for archives less than 1 MB in size. Over the central directory structures, we extracted 1024 dimensional feature vectors: string length-hash histograms, byte entropy features, and hashed N-grams. Over the last 1 MB we extracted 1024 MB byte entropy features and string length-hash histograms. We omitted n-grams due to lengthy extraction times. For our string length-hash features, we used a similar representation to Sec. VI, except that we used length 2 as a lower-bound cutoff for considering a given string.
As classifiers, we used XGBoost and a DNN. Results are shown in Fig. 5 . Surprisingly, the DNN's performance was inferior to XGB over any single feature type, and using a concatenated 5120-dimensional feature vector the network noticeably under-performed XGB, offering an ROC with an AUC of 0.98. Concatenating all features using XGBoost yielded an AUC of greater than 0.99, with differences particularly pronounced in low-FPR regions.
Via the same methodology in Sec. VI, we used the DNN to extract deep features, concatenated them with the five feature types, and fit an XGBoost classifier. This resulted in noticeably diminished performance for the XGBoost classifier, suggesting that the network was unable to learn a meaningful feature space. Perhaps this problem could be ameliorated by using a larger archive dataset, or perhaps archives are intrinsically harder to learn meaningful features on than documents.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Our research suggests that ML is a viable approach for certain malicious email attachment scanner applications, particularly those tuned for a high FPR. Using fixed-size histogram features as input, both DNN and XGB classifiers offered comparable performance for office document data, but XGB far and away outperformed DNNs on generic Zip archive data. Perhaps, more archive data is simply required for DNNs to perform well. Since concatenating deep features as input to XGB diminished performance, perhaps to the extent that DNNs work, they are simply learning to "memorize" interesting patterns without deriving feature spaces that offer smooth statistical support. In the future, we plan to collect a larger datasets and perhaps explore additional attachment formats (e.g., RAR, 7ZIP, GZIP, CAB, PDF, etc.). Even if a DNN tends to use its capacity for memorization, sufficient data could render still render it practical for archive problems, but may make it strongly susceptible to novel malware types or adversarial attacks. Fortuitously, our feature representation may make it difficult to evade our model with gradient-based attacks, such as those developed in [23] - [27] , since our feature representations make heavy use of hashing and identifying plausible modifications to a file that produce the desired adversarial perturbations in hash space could be nontrivial.
There is a lot of room to expand the use of deep learning in the anti-malware space. With respect to endpoint deployment, the extent to which a joint representation can be leveraged over multiple file types and formats without introducing the problem of catastrophic forgetting [28] is an important area for future research. It will also be interesting to see if more sophisticated network types which derive their features from generic raw bytes become viable in coming years.
978-1-5386-3443-1/18/$31.00 ©2018 IEEE
